Session Information
Symposium
Time:
2016-08-26
09:00-10:30
Room:
NM-F104
Chair:
Lynn Fendler
Discussant:
Paulus Julius Smeyers
Contribution
Nonrepresentational theories suggest a radical break from conventional Enlightenment-oriented philosophical worldviews. It is not surprising, then, that philosophers would be suspicious or dismissive of such a radical departure. If possibilities for epistemology (including data and knowledge production) were deregulated to the extent permitted by nonrepresentational theories, then what would remain as criteria for value judgments, evaluation, and quality control? If we collapsed the epistemological world from two layers (the experienced and the rationalized) to one single layer, then what would prevent chaos and disorder in human life? How could educational philosophies support and advance betterment of human civilization?
There are two interrelated lines of argument for addressing fears and objections that may be prompted by nonrepresentational theory’s radical deregulation of epistemology in research. First, scientific abstraction is always already part of our experience. Just because nonrepresentational theory validates human experience as a legitimate basis for epistemology does not imply that scientific abstraction is thereby disallowed as a legitimate basis for epistemology. Western metaphysics is more exclusive than nonrepresentational theory; in logical empiricism, some phenomena of human experience are disqualified from consideration as objects of research and excluded from the historical record. Nonrepresentational perspectives, on the other hand, tend to be more diverse and inclusive, rather than homogeneously classified and exclusive. Therefore, the adoption of nonrepresentational theory does not foreclose the possibility of including rational or scientific approaches as mechanisms for addressing social and educational issues.
A second line of defense for nonrepresentational theory is that it does not fall prey to the inherent contradiction of logical empiricism, namely that the fundamental tenets of logical empiricism are themselves not confirmable, verifiable, or falsifiable. Nonrepresentational theory does not rely on metaphysics, or any other abstract system, to establish legitimacy for inclusion/exclusion because it rejects the mechanism of representation per se. The criteria for inclusion are not foundational/essential, but that does not mean there are no criteria. In nonrepresentational theory, criteria are not foundational but existential. Evaluation consists of judgments of the effectiveness with which human experience is brought to life in the presentation. In that way, nonrepresentational judgments resemble artistic connoisseurship more than scientific algorithms.
As a performance of nonrepresentational judgment, this presentation includes an activity. Participants will be invited to record and share symposium experiences, reflecting on the entities that are/not present as elements of experience.
References
Fendler, L. & Smeyers, P. (2015). Perspectives on representational and non-representational language-games for educational history and theory. Part 2: Focusing on presentation instead of representation. Paedagogica Historica,51(6): 691-701.
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